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INTRODUCTION
Governance for protected areas seeks to negotiate outcomes 
that conserve biodiversity while also providing for sustainable 
resource use. National legal and policy frameworks governing 
protected areas are embedded in international agreements 
such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) policy 
guidelines that establish an internationally agreed framework 
for identifying and classifying protected areas. The IUCN 
definition of a protected area is ‘a clearly defined geographical 
space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or 
other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of 
nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values’ 
(Dudley 2008: 9). 
Historically, protected areas controlled by governments 
have been a primary mechanism for conserving the world’s 
biodiversity. However, over the past two decades protected 
area governance has diversified, with significant growth 
in private and community-based management, as well as a 
variety of partnership-based models (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2013). This diversification has been driven by both ethical 
and pragmatic needs to take into account local community 
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dependence on ecosystem goods and services, respect the 
rights of indigenous peoples, and address failures of top-down 
governance to deliver expected outcomes (Ghimire and Pimbert 
1997; Stevens 1997; Anderson and James 2001; Brechin et al. 
2002; Phillips 2003; Cumming 2004). Under these influences, 
power has been redistributed across multiple public, private 
and civil society organizations, and collaborative governance 
arrangements are now widespread (McCarthy 2007; Lockwood 
2010). 
Collaborative governance of protected areas has the 
potential to yield multiple biodiversity and socio-economic 
benefits through the formation of alliances and partnerships 
between stakeholders (governments, the private sector, local 
communities, and non-governmental organizations) as a means 
of developing consensus and efficiently deploying available 
skills and resources (Munthali 2007). Such arrangements can 
draw on various knowledge systems to foster trust and develop 
joint visions, promote experiential and experimental learning 
and function as bridging organizations that lower the costs 
of collaboration and conflict resolution (Folke et al. 2005; 
Armitage et al. 2009). 
Theoretical and empirical research into collaborative 
governance arrangements for the management of environmental 
resources has identified characteristics that are likely to 
underpin success. Frameworks and associated guidance for 
designing effective collaborative governance institutions 
have been offered by Ansell and Gash (2008); Ostrom (2009) 
on conditions likely to favour successful local community 
governance of common-pool resources, and her institutional 
analysis and development (IAD) framework (Ostrom and Cox 
2010); design principles for community-based natural resource 
management (Cox et al. 2010); and Cheng and Sturtevant’s 
(2012) framework for assessing collaborative capacity in 
community-based public forest management in six arenas of 
collaborative action (organizing, learning, deciding, acting, 
evaluating, legitimizing).
Drawing on this literature, we investigate the argument that 
successful collaborative governance arrangements are more 
likely to develop under particular conditions that include 
incentives for community engagement, formal mechanisms 
for power sharing, local ownership of resources, downward 
accountability, mechanisms for building trust, and an adaptive 
approach to performance assessment and improvement. 
To ensure a common understanding of ‘collaborative 
governance’, we adopted a modified version of the Ansell and 
Gash’s (2008: 544) definition: ‘a governing arrangement where 
multiple state- and non-state actors engage in a collective 
decision-making process that is formally organised, consensus-
oriented, and deliberative and that aims to develop and/or 
implement policies, plans or management programs’. The 
institutionalisation of a collective decision-making process 
is central to this definition. The term ‘consensus-oriented’ 
is used because, although collaborative forums often do not 
succeed in reaching consensus, the premise of engaging in a 
deliberative, multilateral, and formal forum is to strive toward 
consensus or, at least, to identify areas of agreement. We differ 
at only one point from Ansell and Gash (2008) and follow 
Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2013) and Emerson et al. (2012) 
in not requiring the governance arrangement to be initiated 
and led by one or more government agencies and thereby 
generalising the Ansell and Gash definition.
Ansell and Gash (2008) also identified six criteria that a 
governance arrangements needs to possess in order to meet 
their definition. Given our generalisation of their definition, 
these criteria can be reformulated as: 1) the forum is initiated 
by a legitimate governance authority; 2) participants in the 
forum include government and non-state actors; 3) participants 
engage directly in decision making; 4) the forum is formally 
organised and meets collectively; 5) the forum aims to make 
decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not achieved in 
practice); and 6) the focus of collaboration is on developing 
and/or implement policies, plans or management programs. 
Collaborative Governance in Laos and Vietnam
On paper, the Lao Government’s conservation policy seems 
to fit well into the above described concept of collaborative 
governance as it focuses on developing a partnership approach 
to protected area management with the local people who 
live in and depend on the natural resources in these areas 
for their daily livelihoods. Since the early 1990s, policy has 
emphasised participatory action with villagers in developing 
sustainable livelihood and conservation strategies which 
strongly advocates people’s involvement in natural resources 
management and protection (Southammakoth and Craig 2000; 
Robichaud et al. 2001; Poulsen and Luanglath 2005; Corbett 
2008). According to these authors, the development of a 
successful system of participatory co-management requires 
that both guardian communities and government take on 
appropriate and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for 
conservation and protection. However in practice, according 
to Baird (2000), there remains a number of obstacles to 
implementing collaborative governance in protected areas 
in Laos. These include problems related to mutual trust and 
respect between villagers and protected areas staff, institutional 
constraints, and village to village conflict. Furthermore, a key 
area of concern is that corruption is deeply entrenched in Lao 
political culture with decisions being made top-down through a 
one-party closed and authoritarian political system (Stuart-Fox 
2006; Hodgdon 2010). This has resulted in numerous examples 
of unsustainable donor driven projects due to the lack of further 
financing or political will (Poulsen and Luanglath 2005; Stuart-
Fox 2006; Singh 2008; Hodgdon 2010; Dwyer et al. 2016). 
Other relevant research in the region has also identified 
problems with the implementation of a collaborative governance 
agenda. Watts et al. (2010) used participatory action research 
to investigate governance of a multifunctional landscape 
adjacent to a protected area in Vieng Kham District, Luang 
Prabang Province. They found that poor access to information 
communication technologies inhibited local actors’ levels 
of participation and their ability to effectively manage the 
landscape. Mai et al. (2013) analysed the governance systems 
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of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in relation to biodiversity 
conservation, with an emphasis on law enforcement and 
capacity. They noted that although there are instances of 
increased local community involvement forest governance, 
ongoing issues include unclear mandates, poor communication 
of legal requirements, suboptimal coordination, insecure 
tenure, and lack of an empowered citizenry.
Devolved and collaborative governance has been investigated 
in neighbouring Vietnam. Sikor and Tranh (2007) examined 
devolution of forest management in Vietnam’s Central 
Highlands and found that due to the exclusion of key actors 
the reform led to conflict among local communities and 
contributed to further forest loss. Ingle and Halimi (2007) 
analysed a devolved governance project that sought to 
strengthen stakeholder participation, in particular local 
community involvement, in environmental management 
improvements along the Tan Hoa-Lo Gom canal in Ho Chi 
Minh City. KimDung et al. (2013) noted that co-management 
has been advocated to address continued biodiversity declines 
in special-use forests, a type of protected area in Vietnam, 
but that despite reforms, decision-making power remained 
primarily with provincial governments and argued that further 
reform is needed to decentralise authority and increase public 
involvement. Hübner et al. (2014) examined governance of 
tourism developments in Phong Nha-Ke Bang National Park in 
central Vietnam using Graham et al.’s (2003) good governance 
principles. They found that tourism governance suffered from 
a lack of institutional capacity, excessively centralised decision 
making and inadequate benefit-sharing. Ho et al. (2014) applied 
an analytical framework to assess the dynamics of formal 
institutions, organisational structures, and local community 
engagement, social capital and socio-economic conditions 
for three Vietnamese marine protected areas. Co-management 
networks in Vietnamese coastal governance have also been 
investigated, with Armitage et al. (2011) finding that although 
such networks contributed to trust building and learning, 
such advances will not necessarily halt declining ecological 
condition.
The literature on collaborative governance in these Southeast 
Asian examples raises the question as to whether genuine 
collaborative governance is possible in the Lao context. As 
state governed protected areas have not been very effective 
in Laos and due to the continued lack of resources allocated 
by the Lao Government, it is important to establish more 
successful collaborative governance arrangements. Most 
villagers living in or next to protected areas rely on the natural 
resources from within the protected area and its margins for 
their daily livelihoods. Excluding them will not lead to long 
term sustainability. 
In the following sections we investigate 1) whether Hin 
Nam No NPA arrangements constitute a form of collaborative 
governance according to our definition; 2) identify the extent to 
which Hin Nam No NPA governance meets a set of conditions 
for success; 3) assess the prospects, potential pitfalls and 
areas for improvement for these arrangements to deliver 
joint biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. 
The next section outlines the methods used to undertake an 
assessment of the Hin Nam No NPA governance arrangements. 
In Section 3 we summarise the key features of protected area 
governance in Laos in general, and the Hin Nam No NPA in 
particular. The results are presented in Section 4. We conclude 
with a discussion of implications for successful establishment 
and implementation of co-governance for the reserve, and 
suggest key elements of a continuous improvement agenda.
METHODS
The aims of the research were addressed using a qualitative 
mixed-method approach. The extent to which the emergent 
collaborative governance in Hin Nam No NPA, described in 
Section 3, meets our definition according to the six criteria 
given in Section 1, and whether conditions for success are in 
place, were assessed using document review, a questionnaire, 
interviews with villagers and district officials, and a concluding 
workshop in which participants undertook a summative review 
of progress and developed elements of a new strategic plan. 
The results from these activities were compiled and matched 
against conditions for success that were identified from the 
literature, organised according to the stages of a collaborative 
governance process described by Franks and Booker (2015) 
– preconditions, establishment and maintenance. The findings 
are reported in the Section 4. The prospects, potential pitfalls 
and areas for improvement were identified by the authors 
reflecting on those conditions for success that were absent or 
insufficiently developed, in combination with insights from 
the literature. These findings are reported in the discussion, 
Section 5.
The conditions for success and supporting sources, structured 
according to the Franks and Booker (2015) stages of a 
collaborative governance process, as well as the methods used 
to assess each stage, are indicated in Table 1. 
The key documents included in the review were associated 
with the legislative framework (Section 3); and reports and 
monitoring data from 2014-2016 (Phommasane et al. 2014; 
Sengchanthavong et al. 2014; DFRM/MoNRE 2015; de 
Koning 2015b,c; de Koning and Dobbelsteijn 2015) on the 
subsequent design and establishment  of the Hin Nam No 
collaborative governance structure. The field assessment was 
conducted in February 2014, and comprised three steps: 1) set 
up the governance assessment team and team planning process, 
2) conduct the field research by gathering information and 
analysing information; and 3) organise a strategic planning 
workshop at provincial level to analyse the governance 
assessment as well as to develop a strategic plan. The details 
of the activities involved in the governance assessment are 
summarised as follows:
The interviews were conducted at a village cluster (‘kum 
ban’) level representing the eighteen villages situated around 
the Hin Nam No NPA, Boualapha district, Khammouane. This 
activity was led by the Provincial Office of Natural Resources 
and Environment (PONRE) of Khammouane Province. In 
February 2014, the research team collected information by 
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conducting village interviews using a questionnaire with 
guiding questions in five village clusters namely: 1) Ban Dou 
cluster (34 participants, 5 of whom were women), 2) Kanyou 
cluster plus, 3) Langkhang cluster (28 participants, 3 of whom 
were women), 4) NongPing cluster (17 participants, 4 of whom 
were women), 5) Nongma cluster (38 village representatives, 
4 of whom were women). The locations of these clusters are 
indicated in Figure 1. 
Guiding questions used to structure the interviews were 
adapted from guidelines given in Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
(2013). The following questions were asked to assess the 
preconditions for success: 1) who took the lead in establishing 
the Hin Nam No NPA? 2) who was not involved? 3) who 
decided about natural resource use before the Hin Nam No NPA 
existed and who decides now? 4) is there an overall strategic 
vision for the Hin Nam No NPA by all stakeholders? 
With regard to the conditions for success for the establishment 
stage the following guiding questions were asked: 1) do the 
people who are responsible possess the necessary capacities 
to manage the Hin Nam No NPA? 2) how is information 
Table 1 
Conditions for success used to structure the analysis
Stage Conditions for success1 Methods
Preconditions Village level: Incentives for community engagement; 
Ambition to make it work; Prior history of cooperation; 
Power and resource balance
District level: Institutionalisation; Financial viability
Both levels: Local ownership
Document review
Interviews with key informants from the 18 villages located in the 
five village clusters surrounding the Hin Nam No PA
Interviews with district officials
Questionnaire for the good governance assessment at district level
Establishment Village level: Capacity building; Build on existing 
institutions; Access to information; Stakeholder analysis; 
Formal agreements
District level: Role for local government; Downward 
accountability; Face-to-face dialogue; Trust building; 
Development of commitment and shared understanding
Both levels: Capacity building
Document review
Interviews with key informants from the 18 villages located in the 
five village clusters surrounding the Hin Nam No PA
Interviews with district officials
Questionnaire for the good governance assessment at district level
Concluding and strategic planning workshop at provincial level
Maintenance District level: Regular assessment; Affirmative action; 
Recognise good performance; Adaptive approach;
Both levels: Foster strong leadership
Document review
Concluding and strategic planning workshop at provincial level
Questionnaire used for annual monitoring on good governance
1Compiled from Olsson et al. (2006), Ansell and Gash (2008), Armitage et al. (2009), Kallis et al. (2009), Ostrom and Cox (2010), Emerson et al. (2012), 
Franks and Booker (2015)
Figure 1 
A map of the Hin Nam No NPA and the location of the various guardian and cooperation villages in five village clusters (‘kum ban’) (Source: Ronny 
Dobbelsteijn)
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shared with line agencies and villages and is all information 
available? 3) who is involved in the management of the Hin 
Nam No NPA? 4) are there co-management systems/meetings/
structures in place representing various stakeholders? 5) is 
there a mechanism to enforce Hin Nam No NPA rules and to 
punish people who disobey the rules, if yes, is this done in a 
transparent way, is data collected around this?
In February 2014 a half day governance assessment 
workshop at district level was conducted with a total of 18 
participants (2 women). The participants were representatives 
from the government district staff representing various line 
agencies. The guiding questions used in the interview of district 
staff and the questionnaire for the good governance assessment 
at district level were adapted from guidelines given in Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. (2013). 
The following questions were asked to assess the status of 
preconditions for success: 1) are there sufficient government 
resources allocated to manage the Hin Nam No NPA 
effectively? 2) is the Hin Nam No NPA integrated into the 
social economic development plan of the district? 3) which Hin 
Nam No NPA management tasks are delegated to local people?
With regard to the conditions for success for the establishment 
stage, the guiding questions were: 1) is there room for the 
development and capacity building of local institutions? 2) is 
the Hin Nam No NPA making efficient use of its government 
resources and is it financially sustainable? 4) do villagers have 
legal access to resources such as timber, non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs) and game meat for subsistence?if so, where 
and in how many villages? 5) when there are problems with 
regards to the Hin Nam No NPA, who can local people turn 
to for help and how are problems solved? 6) are the goal and 
objectives for the Hin Nam No NPA broadly agreed by all 
rights/stakeholders? 
With regard to the conditions for success for the maintenance 
stage, the following guiding questions were asked in the self-
assessments held in February 2014, May 2015 and March 2016 
at district level: 1) is there a Hin Nam No NPA management 
monitoring system in place? 2) to which extents do rights-/
stakeholders impacted by the Hin Nam No NPA, receive fair 
compensation (e.g. specific resource use; quota; permits; access 
and land use agreements)? 3) are special activities organised 
to empower vulnerable groups of rights holders in Hin Nam 
No NPA such as ethnic minorities, youth, woman-headed 
households? 4) do performance-based promotion mechanisms 
(e.g. social and financial rewards) exist such as best ranger of 
the month or bonuses upon performance?
In February 2014, a strategic planning workshop at a 
provincial level was conducted and the workshop was divided 
into three presentation sessions (morning) and discussion 
sessions (afternoon) resulting in a one full day workshop. The 
presentations of the first half day focused on the knowledge, 
understanding and sharing of the results of the Hin Nam No 
NPA governance assessment at village cluster and district level 
as well as sharing experiences with the political institution 
National Academic of Political and Public Administration 
(NAPPA) on principles of good governance. The results of 
the village and district interviews were analysed and discussed 
for the various conditions for success for the different stages 
of a collaborative governance process. This resulted in the 
identification of the key bottlenecks and the development of 
a strategic and action plan for future interventions, to promote 
a collaborative governance approach via community based-
solutions.
PROTECTED AREAS IN LAOS AND THE HIN NAM 
NO NATIONAL PROTECTED AREA
Laos Protected Areas System
The protected area system of Laos is one of the youngest 
and ecologically representative protected area systems in 
the world. Currently, Laos has 24 National Protected Areas 
(NPAs) covering 15% of the country. There are also numerous 
provincial and district conservation forests and if these are 
included more than 20% of the land area is under conservation. 
Currently all protected areas in the national system of Laos 
are established and managed under a relatively uniform set of 
management regulations. They can all be classified under the 
IUCN system as Category VI Protected Area with Sustainable 
Use of Natural Resources, as villages and/or village areas 
remain inside protected area boundaries in designated 
controlled use zones (Moore et al. 2012).
The legal framework for the NPAs comprises: 1) Decree 
164 / PM on the establishment of the Lao PDR Protected 
Area System (1993); 2) Regulations on the Management of 
NBCAs, Wildlife and Aquatic Animals No. 0360 / AF (2003); 
3) Forestry Strategy 2020 (2005) and the Forestry Law (2007); 
4) Decree  134 / PM on Conservation Forests (2015); 5) NPA 
management plans; and 6) other sectoral plans which may 
impact on the objectives of NPAs.
Protected areas as a category of forest land use is provided 
in the Forestry Law (2007) under Conservation Forests, Article 
11 as one of three forest types in Laos, which is defined as: 
‘Conservation Forest is forest classified for the utilization 
purposes of conserving the nature, preserving plants and animal 
species, forest ecosystems and other valuable sites of natural, 
historical, cultural, tourism, environmental, educational and 
scientific importance’.
To implement the law, and as a framework for protected 
area management, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
(MAF) issued the Regulation on the Management of Protected 
Areas, Aquatic and Wild Animals, No. 0524/AF (2001), later 
superseded by a revised version No. 0360 (2003). Zoning or 
classification of conservation forests is provided in Article 24 
of the Forestry Law (2007) where four types are distinguished: 
Total Protection Zone (TPZ), Controlled Use Zone (CUZ), 
Corridor Zone, and Buffer Zone. The TPZs and CUZs are 
located inside NPAs while the corridor and buffer zones are 
located outside the NPAs. Although not specifically stated, 
there is an implication that CUZs should be jointly managed 
by villagers with support from the government, while TPZs 
remain the direct responsibility of NPA authorities. Under 
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Article 42 of the Forestry Law (2007), customary utilisation of 
forests is permitted. Customary utilisation of forest and forest 
products in the CUZ of NPAs are required to be practiced in 
accordance with a designed plan, village regulations and State 
forest laws.
Hin Nam No National Protected Area
Hin Nam No National Protected Area (NPA) is situated in 
Boualapha District, Khammouane Province in central Laos. 
It is a portion of a discrete limestone massif situated in the 
Annamite mountain range. It is one of the original 18 National 
Biodiversity Conservation Areas (now called NPAs) of Laos 
established on 29th October 1993 by Prime Ministerial Decree 
164. The Hin Nam No NPA is located on the Lao-Vietnamese 
border in central Laos. The protected area covers 88,500 
hectares and forms part of one of the largest karst regions in 
the world, marked by unique limestone formations. About 
twenty villages live around this NPA (see Figure 1), with a 
total population of 8,000 people, many of whom are ethnic 
minorities. Most of these villagers are very poor and rely on the 
natural resources from within the protected area and its margins 
for their daily livelihoods. Increased hunting, logging and weak 
enforcement of protected area regulations put pressure on Hin 
Nam No’s ecosystem. At the local level technical, financial 
and human government resources for managing and protecting 
the NPA remain inadequate. To address these issues, Hin Nam 
No NPA is seeking to establish collaborative governance 
arrangements with an overall goal ‘to jointly with guardian1 
villages and other stakeholders protect, enhance and manage 
the Hin Nam No National Protected Area and its resources in 
a sustainable manner’ (DFRM/MoNRE 2015: 14).
In Laos, villages located in/around NPAs are categorised into 
four types. Type I comprises enclave villages, found entirely 
inside NPAs. In Type II, the village lands of the villages 
overlap a NPA boundary; Type III are villages whose village 
boundary abuts the NPA boundary; while Type IV comprise 
villages that are situated further away from the NPA boundary. 
According to Provincial office of Natural Resources and 
Environment (PoNRE) of Khammouane Province and local 
villagers, eighteen Hin Nam No NPA guardian villages fall 
under the Type II category, meaning that some of their village 
lands fall within the Hin Nam No NPA. However, all land 
inside the Hin Nam No NPA consists of conservation forests 
and there is no agricultural land or production forest inside 
the Hin Nam No NPA.
Compared to other districts in Khammouane Province, there 
is little cultivation of crops other than rice. The ethnic groups 
around Hin Nam No NPA can be linguistically divided into 
three groups namely Tai-Lao group (Phoutai, Yoi and Kaleung), 
Mon-Khmer group (Makong, Tri), and a mixed group (Nguan 
and Salang). Villages with sufficient flat land such as the 
Tai-Lao group cultivate lowland rice in paddy fields outside 
of the NPA boundaries. Upland rice cultivation is practiced by 
the Mon-Khmer group in the south of Hin Nam No but mostly 
outside of the Hin Nam No NPA boundaries. The Nguan are 
descendants from immigrants from Vietnam who arrived in 
Laos some 50 years ago. For their livelihoods they depend on 
paddy rice farming and doing various types of business. The 
Salang are a special group of people who used to live inside the 
forest of Hin Nam No NPA and were resettled outside the NPA 
boundaries quite some time before being declared as a NPA. 
Their livelihoods used to be based on hunting and gathering. 
Most guardian villages only use the Hin Nam No area for 
hunting, gathering and shelter and only the more accessible 
parts. According to the guardian villagers their traditional lands 
occupy 14 per cent of the Hin Nam No NPA. Consequently, 
the management focus is on distinguishing the Controlled 
Use Zones which reflect the traditional village lands of these 
eighteen villages as defined by themselves, and formulating 
management rules for these zones based on the customary 
rights of the villagers. The remainder of the NPA is designated 
Total Protected Zone and includes areas inaccessible to local 
communities and areas of particular biodiversity value (DFRM/
MoNRE 2015).
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
GmbH (GIZ), have implemented a project ‘Integrated Nature 
Conservation and Sustainable Resource Management in the 
Hin Nam No Region’, which aims to conserve biodiversity 
while alleviating poverty among rural communities. To achieve 
this, GIZ works closely together with the Department of Forest 
Resource Management (DFRM) within the Lao Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE) and their 
provincial and district counterparts. In 2011, the mandate for 
protected area management shifted from MAF to MoNRE, but 
in May 2016, the Lao Government decided that the mandate 
will return to MAF. The project is based on the principles of 
collaborative governance, bringing together authorities and 
local population to deal with the protected area management 
tasks. GIZ contributes institutional support, policy advice and 
capacity development to encourage participation and dialogue 
towards effective and equitable protected area management 
among all stakeholders and provide a model which can be 
used for other protected areas in Laos. The project supports 
payments for biodiversity monitoring , law enforcement 
by village rangers, and develops food security and income 
generating activities for villagers, especially with regard to 
ecotourism and NTFPs (de Koning 2015a). 
In total, 110 village rangers have been selected, trained and 
equipped to do regular monthly or bi-monthly biodiversity 
monitoring, patrolling and law enforcement for small 
infringements for which they get compensated around 12 
Euro per day. The monthly household income of the guardian 
villages is around 90 Euro so the relatively cost-effective 
payment for the village rangers brings a substantial additional 
benefit to their families, especially in the dry season when 
there is no rice cultivation ongoing. The only alternative 
income in the dry season is via increased logging and hunting 
for commercial purposes which is unsustainable in the long 
term. Tourism products (hiking trails; story telling about the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail and the hiding in caves; boat trip in the Xe 
Bang Fai River Cave) have been developed in four guardian 
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villages and this has so far created an additional 9 per cent 
of the monthly household income for the 35 village service 
providers involved. In four villages, Fish Conservation Zones 
have been established which raise 25 per cent of the monthly 
income for the 58 interviewed households, contributing to food 
security through an improvement of the diet.
In May 2015, a Decree on Conservation Forests was endorsed 
by the Lao Government via the Prime Minister. The new decree 
does not explicitly promote collaborative governance, which is 
being piloted in Hin Nam No NPA. However, the new decree 
allows for an increase in participation by the local communities 
in the management of protected areas and gives villagers user 
rights. The Hin Nam No NPA partnership arrangement between 
government authorities and local communities is designed to 
share rights, responsibilities and benefits while protecting and 
managing the natural resources and enhancing the livelihoods 
of the rural communities. Villagers and the Hin Nam No 
authorities work together to conserve biodiversity, ecosystem 
services, tourism and historic/cultural values of Hin Nam No 
while being paid and recognised for their services of about 
an average of 12 Euro per day. As the villagers are closely 
connected to the area, they have local knowledge and ideas on 
how to cost-effectively manage tasks outlined in the Hin Nam 
No NPA co-management plan (DFRM/MoNRE 2015) such 
as regular biodiversity monitoring, patrolling, taking part in 
flora and fauna surveys and providing tourism services. The 
Hin Nam No NPA experiment can provide important lessons 
to guide the formal recognition and design of collaborative 
governance for protected areas in Laos. 
RESULTS
Hin Nam No NPA Arrangements and the Definition of 
Collaborative Governance
The documentary evidence indicates that the collaborative 
governance approach for Hin Nam No NPA: 1) was initiated by 
government agencies as decided in the provincial governance 
assessment strategic planning workshop in February 2014 
based on the results and recommendations derived from a 
governance assessment; 2) participants in the main governing 
body, the Hin Nam No NPA district co-management committee, 
include elected members of all 5 village clusters and therefore 
include non-state actors; 3) village cluster representatives are 
officially part of the Hin Nam No NPA district co-management 
committee responsible for strategic decision making i.e. 
the main governing body of the Hin Nam No NPA; 4) the 
composition of the Hin Nam No NPA district co-management 
committee has been officially endorsed by the district governor 
and a terms of reference is approved in which it is proposed 
for the forum to formally meet at least twice per year; 5) the 
forum aims to make strategic decisions by consensus (even 
if consensus is not achieved in practice e.g. there is still a 
difference of opinion on whether the focus should be on high 
volume/low income tourism development or low volume/high 
income tourism development); and 6) the focus of collaboration 
is the effective governance and management of Hin Nam No 
NPA.
As the establishment of the governance arrangements for 
Hin Nam No NPA meets all six criteria associated with the 
definition given in Section 1, we can conclude that it qualifies 
as collaborative governance. In the following section, we 
investigate the extent that conditions supportive of successful 
collaborative governance are in place based on the stages 
of a collaborative governance process described by Franks 
and Booker (2015) – preconditions, establishment and 
maintenance.
Analysis of Hin Nam No NPA Governance against 
Success Factors – Preconditions 
Table 2 summarises the results that identify whether the 
preconditions for success are evident for Hin Nam No NPA 
collaborative governance. These results were derived from 
the governance assessments at the village cluster and district 
levels, as well as subsequent interventions in 2014 and 2015 
that followed the provincial strategic planning workshop.
Financial sustainability remains the major weakness, as 
the Lao Government has committed few human and financial 
resources to protected area management and most NPAs are 
able to function only through external donor funding. It is 
unlikely that government financing will increase in the coming 
years which limits the potential to sustain and maintain the 
collaborative governance set-up of Hin Nam No if no other 
outside funding is found. New funding opportunities through 
involvement of the private sector (biodiversity off-sets and 
corporate social responsibility) should be further explored. 
The lack of government financing re-emphasises the need 
for collaborative governance as there will be no effective 
management without the use of village resources.
Analysis of Hin Nam No NPA Governance against 
Success Factors – Establishment
The results for the establishment stage of Hin Nam No NPA 
derived from the governance assessments and strategic 
planning workshop are given in Table 3. The work of 
Sengchanthavong et al. (2014) provided a stakeholder analysis 
and facilitated participants’ access to key information sources. 
This contributed to the initial development of joint commitment 
and shared understanding amongst village and district level 
stakeholders. Further trust building is needed as the governance 
assessment indicated a top-down system of decision making 
and unclear delegation of tasks to guardian villages. In the Lao 
system, almost all decisions are taken by government without 
downward accountability (Stuart-Fox 2006; Singh 2008; 
Hodgdon 2010). Empowering village cluster representatives 
to make decisions in the context of multi-level agreements 
about NPA rules and management directions would provide a 
basis for effective upward accountability of local-level decision 
makers and downwards accountability of government. Such 
decisions could address, for example, access and natural 
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resource use rights, including setting the level of fines to be 
imposed in the case of infringements.
Official local institutions have been established on three 
levels i.e. village co-management committees (VCMC); 
village cluster co-management committees (VCCMC) and 
the Hin Nam No NPA district co-management committee (Hin 
Nam No DCMC). As no suitable local institutions existed it 
was not possible to build on existing institutions. Incentives 
for community engagement have been established in the Hin 
Nam No NPA district co-management by-laws endorsed by 
the District Governor in 2015 and through the payment of 
village rangers. The current form of the Hin Nam No NPA 
collaborative governance structure is illustrated in Figure 2.
Capacity building promoted by the GIZ project has started 
both for government officials and for participating villagers. 
The interventions are based on a detailed capacity needs 
assessment for effective protected area management carried out 
in 2013, which drew on the ASEAN competence standards for 
protected area jobs published in 2003 (Xayvaongsa et al. 2013).
Analysis of Hin Nam No NPA Governance against 
Success Factors – Maintenance
The results from the governance assessment on village cluster 
and district level, to investigate if Hin Nam No NPA adheres to 
the conditions for success of collaborative governance for the 
maintenance stage are indicated in Table 4. Also the results of 
the subsequent interventions from 2014 to 2016 that followed 
upon the strategic planning workshop on provincial level are 
indicated in Table 4.
As all 18 guardian villages expressed their wish to 
engage in the collaborative governance approach the 
Table 2 
Results with regard to the preconditions for success
Conditions for success Governance assessment Subsequent interventions
Village level: 
Incentives for 
community engagement 
Ambition 
Prior history of conflict 
of cooperation 
Power and resource 
imbalances
District level: 
Institutionalisation 
Financial viability
Both levels: 
Local ownership
Village level: 
- Willingness and availability of guardian 
villages and village rangers to be involved in 
Hin Nam No NPA management
- Local natural resource management rules 
exist but are being ignored by outsiders 
i.e., illegal wildlife poachers and illegal 
loggers and traders from outside the guardian 
villages, including Laotians and foreigners
District level: 
- No clear delegation of decision making or 
implementation authority to guardian villages
- Zonation Hin Nam No NPA into manageable 
units per guardian village unclear
- Management of Hin Nam No NPA depends 
entirely on outsource funding
Both levels: 
- Goal and objectives of Hin Nam No NPA 
not clear to all stakeholders
Village level: 
- Agreement on natural resource management rules per zone based 
on customary rights and broad dissemination of the information
- Set-up of participatory biodiversity monitoring and patrolling 
system with remuneration for 110 village rangers working on a 
part-time basis
District level: 
- Hin Nam No management identified tasks to be delegated to 
guardian villages
- Participatory zonation based on customary rights in all guardian 
villages; draft plan of management units per guardian villages 
available
- Elaborate a sustainable financing strategy for Hin Nam No NPA 
and piloting of tourism ticketing entrance fee system
- Improved integration of Hin Nam No NPA in the social economic 
development plan of the district and in the plans of other line 
agencies and projects to attract more government resources
Both levels: 
- Jointly agree on strategic goal and objectives in strategic 
co-management plan 2016-2020
Table 3 
Result of conditions for success in the establishment stage
Conditions for success Governance assessment Subsequent interventions
Village level: 
Capacity building 
Access to information 
Good stakeholder analysis 
Build on existing institutions 
Formal agreements
District level: 
Downward accountability 
Role of local government 
Face-to-face dialogue 
Trust building 
Development of commitment and 
shared understanding
Both levels: 
Capacity building
Village level: 
- Lack of communication and awareness 
raising
- Collaborative governance system is ad 
hoc and top down with lack of systematic 
benefit sharing
District level: 
- Unclear, slow and ineffective law 
enforcement system
Both levels: 
- Lack of skills and capacity; lack of 
involvement by women
Village level: 
- Set-up and implement awareness raising activities and 
broad dissemination of information
- Development of participatory planning and reporting 
system on village (18), village cluster (5) and NPA level; 
institutions and agreements including benefit sharing 
officially endorsed in 2015
District level: 
- Some delegation of law enforcement to guardian villages 
and payment of village rangers to ensure a more rapid and 
effective response
- Capacity development plan and recruitment of 5 female 
government volunteers in March 2014
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District Governor is showing increased leadership and 
commitment. From June-September 2015 various thematic 
working groups under the Hin Nam No NPA district co-
management committee established a 5 year strategic Hin 
Nam No NPA co-management plan 2016-2020 (DFRM/
MoNRE 2015). The plan was endorsed by the Hin Nam No 
NPA district co-management committee, which is the official 
body for providing oversight and strategic direction for the 
collaborative governance system.
Further capacity building and leadership trainings both for 
government staff and villagers are planned in the coming 
five years, as well as affirmative action to address gender 
imbalances at the local level. To date only five of the 87 
elected co-management members are women (Phommasane 
et al. 2014). Management effectiveness and good governance 
self-assessments were conducted in 2014, 2015 and 2016, 
and further annual reviews are planned for the next five 
years. Facilitated discussions of assessment results amongst 
stakeholders are showing promise in terms of supporting an 
adaptive approach to governance and management. Reward 
systems for good performance are planned under conservation 
agreements to be worked out in the coming five years 
(DFRM/MoNRE 2015). 
PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTIVE HIN NAM NO NPA 
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
In this article an innovative collaborative governance approach, 
in which local villagers are a key player in partnership with the 
Lao Government, is analysed against a number of conditions 
for success. From the results in Hin Nam No NPA, we argue 
that successful collaborative governance arrangements are 
more likely to develop under particular conditions that provide 
incentives for community engagement, formal mechanisms 
for power sharing, local ownership of resources based on 
customary rights, downward accountability, mechanisms 
for building trust, and an adaptive approach to performance 
assessment and improvement. 
Figure 2 
Current form of Hin Nam No NPA collaborative governance structure
Table 4 
Result of conditions for success in the maintenance stage
Conditions for success Governance assessment Subsequent interventions
District level: 
Adaptive approach 
Regular assessment 
Affirmative action 
Recognise good performance
Both levels: 
Foster strong leadership
District level: 
-Lack of backstopping and monitoring system
- No special interventions for marginalised groups
- No recognition of good performance
- Lack of transparency and unclear decision 
making process
District level: 
- Inclusion of incentives for good performance in draft 
conservation agreements for village eco-tourism service 
providers and village rangers - Set-up of thematic 
working groups between different line agencies and 
villagers to create institutional learning and come to a 
more adaptive approach
- Formally agree on the terms of reference and mandate 
of the various co-management structures and appoint the 
chair and secretary
-Set-up of a regular participatory monitoring system 
on biodiversity; income generation; capacity building; 
financial expenditures and outcomes such as management 
effectiveness and governance to increase learning and 
transparency
Both levels: 
- Capacity building on good governance and good 
leadership for the co-management structures on different 
levels (village, village cluster; NPA), including training 
on gender
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Many of the conditions for success for the three stages 
of collaborative governance have improved through the 
subsequent interventions planned by a broad group of 
stakeholders in 2014. These improvements are significant for 
the degree of success of the collaborative governance for Hin 
Nam No NPA, as the initial governance assessment identified 
challenges and weaknesses with regard to top-down decision 
making and lack of participation. The collaborative governance 
arrangements for Hin Nam No NPA are now better-placed to 
succeed. However, the extent and potential of collaborative 
governance will remain limited in the Lao context as long 
as there is a lack of long term government financing and 
political will. We envisage that the sustainability of current 
natural resource and land use practices in the villages in and 
around the Hin Nam No NPA will improve through effective 
decentralised governance which has now been formalised via 
the collaborative governance agreements, with most benefits 
accruing to the guardian villages through recognition of their 
customary rights. In the collaborative governance agreements 
clear delegation of management tasks and access and use rights 
are given to the guardian villages with local benefit sharing 
in the fines for infringements. In addition, environmental 
awareness raising among villagers and their neighbours can be 
expected to increasing the capacity of villagers to sustainably 
develop and manage their livelihoods. 
Planned support and interventions over the next five years 
are designed to equip local communities with the necessary 
knowledge, skills, and organizational capacities to take 
responsibility of the allocated geographical areas in their own 
hands and safeguard forest and natural resources in their village 
area and the Hin Nam No NPA. Community based conservation 
agreements that include active community involvement 
in resource management will require strengthening of 
community-based user groups and the capacity development 
of those groups for managing their resources. These further 
interventions will take time to develop and require further 
external support.
The good governance reassessment conducted in 2015 
and 2016, as a repetition on the baseline assessment of 
2014; indicate that there are still a number of challenges. 
Vulnerable groups need to be better integrated in legislation 
and implementation, and non-government stakeholders still 
need to be included in technical reporting on reserve condition 
and trends. The newly-established collaborative governance 
system can address this issue by instituting a more participatory 
and decentralised reporting and planning system. Moreover, 
hunting, logging and encroachment are increasing in certain 
areas where there is improved road access. Certain roads 
along the Hin Nam No NPA have been upgraded by the Lao 
Government to bring services, such as electricity, closer to the 
people or provide easier access to mining sites. These roads are 
used by non-local Laotians and foreign traders (businessmen 
and government officials) for illegal logging. The traders often 
use local people to get valuable hard wood or certain animal 
species out of the Hin Nam No NPA for a relatively low price 
compared to the market price. As application of regulations 
remains intermittent and inconsistent, these activities pose a 
serious threat to Hin Nam No NPA. Further development and 
implementation of the inclusive law enforcement strategy 
articulated in the strategic Hin Nam No NPA co-management 
plan (DFRM/MoNRE 2015) has the potential to partially 
address this concern through a more transparent stakeholder 
dialogue under the leadership of the District Governor’s 
office. The village rangers have already implemented several 
successful law enforcement interventions in which fines were 
paid locally by Vietnamese trespassers and benefits shared 
between the stakeholders as outlined in the co-management 
agreements. 
We found that the annual good governance assessment is a 
relatively easy and cost-effective method for monitoring the 
status and trends in social and environmental outcomes and 
to identify remaining challenges. So far the ethnic groups 
in the village clusters of Nongping, Langkhang and Dou 
(Tai-Lao and mixed ethnic groups) indicate an improvement 
in the interaction between government and villagers while 
the Kanyou cluster (Tai-Lao group) and Nongma cluster 
(Mon-Khmer) score a more modest improvement in good 
governance. The Kanyou cluster has only delineated a very 
small CUZ due to the inaccessibility to the Hin Nam No and 
therefore the villagers see little benefit from the Hin Nam No. 
The Nongma cluster is less visited by the government due 
to language barriers and its inaccessibility during the rainy 
season. However, all village cluster scored higher compared 
to the baseline assessment of February 2014. The emerging 
capacity for adaptive management enables a focus on outcomes 
and supports effective action planning and allocation of limited 
government resources.  
However, participants in the collaborative governance of Hin 
Nam No NPA need to remain alert to potential pitfalls related to 
sustainable financing and nature of the political system in Laos. 
So far, the Lao Government has not committed substantial 
resources towards the effective and equitable management 
of NPAs. There is a risk that the collaborative governance 
system will not be maintained once funding from supporting 
development partners such as GIZ is phased out, as has been 
the case in many other donor funded projects (Stuart-Fox 2006; 
Singh 2008; Hodgdon 2010; Dwyer et al. 2016). New benefit 
sharing arrangements as part of the collaborative governance 
reforms and the establishment of a conservation trust fund 
are two important elements of a sustainable finance strategy 
(DFRM/MoNRE 2015). There may also be potential to tap 
other sources of income from adjacent mining, hydropower 
and tourism industries. However, a proposed hydropower 
development of the Xe Bang Fai River upstream of the Xe Bang 
Fai River Cave at the border of the Hin Nam No NPA has been 
put on hold due to its technical and economical infeasibility. 
A pro-active approach towards mining companies and other 
developers operating in the region could potentially finance the 
collaborative governance arrangements through biodiversity 
offsets or corporate social responsibility schemes.
A key area of concern is Stuart-Fox’s (2006) conclusion and 
re-emphasised by Hodgdon (2010), that corruption is deeply 
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entrenched in Lao political culture. That culture, depending as 
it does on patronage relationships between politically powerful 
figures and their extended ‘clans’ of dependents and supporters, 
has deep historical roots. Efforts by multilateral lending 
institutions to convince the Lao Government to introduce 
economic reforms that would have the effect of providing 
greater transparency, so reducing corruption, have had only 
limited success because they threaten to reduce the means 
available for the exercise of patronage. The collaborative 
governance of Hin Nam No NPA can be expected to face 
challenges in this regard, given the valuable timber and 
other resources in and around the NPA. Interventions with 
regard to more transparency at road checkpoints remain an 
‘off-limits’ issue for now as apparently the stakes are too high. 
The relative inaccessibility of the region and limited land-use 
alternatives may mitigate these concerns. It is also of interest 
to note that Hin Nam No NPA is earmarked to become the first 
natural World Heritage Site in Laos which might lead to more 
commitment and political will to keep the area intact to attract 
more tourists in the future. 
An initial governance assessment revealed that many 
conditions for a successful collaborative governance 
arrangement were not in place. However, subsequent 
planning and interventions that followed upon the governance 
assessment had promising outcomes. The main factors 
underpinning improved governance were the strong leadership 
by PONRE, the District Governor’s office and a local social 
enterprise. These three champions facilitated the establishment 
of the Hin Nam No governance structure. Villages formed 
elected committees which have a formal mandate to protect 
and manage the natural resources in and around Hin Nam 
No NPA in accordance with an approved management plan. 
At the same time, the collaborative governance approach 
now assists the Lao Government and local administrative 
authorities in terms of monitoring and managing Hin Nam No 
NPA based on customary rights as outlined in the collaborative 
governance agreements through clear access and use rights and 
fines for infringements. The tendency of devolution policies 
to exclude the claims of some local actors (Sikor and Tranh 
2007) has now been addressed through the acknowledgement 
of customary rights.
The jointly formulated collaborative governance agreement 
between the guardian villages and the district administration 
is being seen as a pilot for similar arrangements elsewhere in 
Laos. In this case this has been done through the establishment 
of formal mechanisms for power sharing, with mixing of 
technical and administrative agendas, in line with relevant 
legislation (Law on Local Administration, 2003 and the 
“Sam Sang / three builds” system as stated in Prime Minister 
Order No.16 dated 15th June 2012). The alignment of the 
collaborative governance with formal decentralisation policies 
is new in Laos and fosters not only administrative but also 
democratic decentralization which has been problematic in the 
region (KimDung et al. 2013). The formation of horizontal and 
vertical linkages and networks foster trust building and social 
learning (Armitage et al. 2009). The associated discussions 
around the scores of the governance self-assessment 
questionnaires  assisted in establishing government recognition 
of the need for governance reform and support for a 
collaborative approach. There is potential to replicate the Hin 
Nam No NPA collaborative governance model, or elements 
thereof, in other NPAs in Laos. As demonstrated in this paper, 
participatory governance assessment and action planning 
provide a useful starting process for developing collaborative 
governance as they promote common understandings and 
visions amongst stakeholders. This finding supports Emerson 
et al.’s (2012) view that participants’ explicit consideration 
of collaborative dynamics is important during initiation of 
a collaborative governance model because it allows shared 
ownership and motivation for joint action.
The approach of analysing conditions for success across 
three stages of developing collaborative governance – 
preconditions, establishment and maintenance – provided an 
effective means of diagnosing strengths and identifying areas 
for improvement. As Ostrom (2007:15181) notes, rather than 
trying to optimise specific variables, we need to engage with 
the complex dynamics of governance systems and ‘develop 
diagnostic methods to identify combinations of variables that 
affect the incentives and actions of actors’. The variables in 
our case comprised: incentives for community engagement, 
formally organised mechanisms for power sharing, local 
ownership of resources based on customary rights, downward 
accountability, mechanisms for building trust, and an adaptive 
approach to performance assessment and improvement. The 
Hin Nam No participatory governance self-assessments and 
the mixing of technical and administrative agendas, in line with 
relevant legislation, are valuable mechanisms for achieving 
reform and support a collaborative approach to protected 
areas governance. 
The collaborative governance concept is a new approach 
for NPA management in Laos. We conclude that the Hin Nam 
No arrangements qualify as collaborative governance. In this 
article we have shown that, on the back of improved conditions 
for success, progress has been made in further strengthening 
collaborative mechanisms in the Hin Nam No NPA. The 
findings of this study contribute to the growing literature 
on collaborative governance of protected areas. However, 
long term realisation and improvement of the collaborative 
governance arrangements depend on sustaining and further 
establishing the conditions for success.
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NOTES
1. A guardian village is actively involved in the protection of the 
protected area based on their customary rights.
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